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APPLYING LIFE INSURANCE PRINCIPLES 
TO COASTAL PROPERTY INSURANCE TO 
INCENTIVIZE ADAPTATION TO  
CLIMATE CHANGE 
EDWARD P. RICHARDS, JD, MPH* 
Abstract: Current levels of greenhouse gases will result in significant sea lev-
el rise in the future, irrespective of the success of any future mitigation efforts. 
Paleoclimate and geologic data from past periods of rising sea level show that 
low lying areas, especially river deltas which are home to half a billion peo-
ple, will be inundated. The best way to represent this risk through insurance is 
to apply the human-life insurance model to coastal property insurance. Hu-
man-life insurance is based on the assumption that every insured will die. Be-
cause the risk of death increases with age, the cost of insurance increases with 
age. Property-life insurance assumes that coastal properties will be lost at an 
unknown future date determined by the rate of sea level rise and patterns of 
catastrophic storms. As with human-life insurance, premiums would increase 
on a regular schedule through time. This predictable premium increase would 
create a powerful risk signal to incentivize adaptation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The earth is warming, the oceans are getting more acidic, and the cli-
mate is becoming more extreme.1 The terms of the Paris Agreement on cli-
mate change aspire to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but the 
pledges in the agreement will only limit warming to 3.5 degrees Celsius.2 
Even if mitigation efforts limit the increase in temperature to the optimistic 
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 1 Phil Plait, Climate Change: It’s Real, and It’s Us, SLATE (Sept. 30, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/bad_astronomy/2013/09/30/climate_change_it_s_real_and_it_s_us.html [https://
perma.cc/UN7P-KS34]. 
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goal of two degrees Celsius, there will be significant harm to selected popu-
lations. 3  Most of this harm will be mediated through extreme weather 
events such as droughts, heat waves, and catastrophic storms.4 Because in-
surance is a key strategy in managing extreme weather risk, it is logical to 
assume that insurance should play an important role in adapting to climate 
change.5 
The role of insurance in driving adaptation is limited because most in-
sured risks are short-term weather risks that are not tightly linked to climate 
change during the time period of the typical insurance policy.6 The best fit 
is insurance for flooding of coastal communities that is exacerbated by 
baked-in sea level rise and climate change enhanced storms.7 Such proper-
ties are currently insured by a combination of National Flood Insurance 
Program (“NFIP”) policies, some private excess coverage for flooding, and 
federal disaster relief that is provided after specific events.8 This bundle of 
resources is highly subsidized and encourages rebuilding in areas that are 
already at high risk and which will eventually be inundated.9 
This Article argues that these high-risk coastal properties should be 
seen as having a life expectancy defined by future sea level rise. Similar to 
a person buying life insurance, the property owner and the insurer would 
not know when the property would flood, only that it is inevitable. As with 
life insurance, the cost of insurance would increase as the risk (sea level as 
opposed to age) increases with time. The predictable increasing cost of in-
surance would reduce the value of the property over time. Without an assur-
ance of long-term value, there would be less political resistance to govern-
mental programs that buy and tear down endangered properties to allow the 
coast to retreat inland. This would reduce catastrophic losses and deaths, 
and better preserve coastal ecology. 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Jeff Tollefson, Global-Warming Limit of 2°C Hangs in the Balance, 520 NATURE 14, 14 
(2015). 
 4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME 
EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 29 (2012). 
 5 JOHN MCANENEY ET AL., MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTA-
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 7 Benjamin H. Strauss et al., Carbon Choices Determine U.S. Cities Committed to Futures 
Below Sea Level, 112 PNAS 13,508, 13,512 (2015). 
 8 Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance 
1, 3 (U. Mich. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 111, 2015), http://repository.
law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1221&context=law_econ_current [https://perma.cc/H7CE-
6VRU]. 
 9 Jeffrey J. Pompe & James R. Rinehart, Property Insurance for Coastal Residents: Govern-
ments’ “Ill Wind,” 13 INDEP. REV. 189, 203–04 (2008). 
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I. RETHINKING STEADY STATE EARTH 
It is ironic that we think of geology as being static and humanity as be-
ing flexible and adaptable.10 We see climate change/climate disruption as a 
potential existential threat to humanity, yet the history of the earth is one of 
an ever-changing climate that reshapes the face of the planet.11 There have 
been five strong glacial cycles during the past 500,000 years.12 The Holo-
cene, the current geologic age, began 11,700 years ago, as the earth was 
warming after the end of the last ice age.13 Human evolution occurred dur-
ing this period of dramatically changing climate.14 There is evidence that 
the changing climate influenced human evolution.15 
Human civilization, however, evolved during a roughly 4,000-year pe-
riod of stable climate.16 Major world cities developed on coastal ports that 
in previous millennia had been under meters of water at one point and tens 
of miles inland at another.17 Temperate agricultural belts have been stable 
for thousands of years in places that in past ages were under a mile of ice 
and then became tropical forests.18 Although it is impossible to say how 
long the climate standstill might have lasted without the industrial revolu-
tion, the climate cycle is now turning again.19 
                                                                                                                           
 10 JEFFERSON AIRPLANE, CROWN OF CREATION (RCA 1968). 
 11 R. Bintanja & R.S.W. Van de Wal, North American Ice-Sheet Dynamics and the Onset of 
100,000-Year Glacial Cycles, 454 NATURE 869, 869 (2008). 
 12 See Laurent Augustin et al., Eight Glacial Cycles from an Antarctic Ice Core, 429 NATURE 
623, 623 (2004). 
 13 Mike Walker et al., Formal Definition and Dating of the GSSP (Global Stratotype Section 
and Point) for the Base of the Holocene Using the Greenland NGRIP Ice Core, and Selected Aux-
iliary Records, 24 J. QUATERNARY SCI. 3, 10 (2009). 
 14 Stanley H. Ambrose, Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution, 291 SCI. 1748, 1753 
(2001). 
 15 See generally Jonathan F. Donges et al., Nonlinear Detection of Paleoclimate-Variability 
Transitions Possibly Related to Human Evolution, 108 PNAS 20,422 (2011) (suggesting a correla-
tion between changes in climate and rate of evolutionary change in humans). 
 16 See Kent V. Flannery, The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations, 3 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & 
SYSTEMATICS 399, 401 (1972). 
 17 Most of the great ports and coastal cities are on river deltas that did not exist until sea level 
rise slowed about 6000 years ago. Daniel Jean Stanley & Andrew G. Warne, Worldwide Initiation 
of Holocene Marine Deltas by Deceleration of Sea-Level Rise, 265 SCI. 228, 229 (1994). Before 
then, they had been far inland. Id. 
 18 JEFF ANDRESEN ET AL., U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, HISTORICAL CLIMATE 
AND CLIMATE TRENDS IN THE MIDWESTERN USA 3, 8 (2012). 
 19 Eric McLamb, The Ecological Impact of the Industrial Revolution, ECOLOGY (Sept. 18, 2011) 
[https://perma.cc/6STN-HP4A] (original hyperlink no longer active); David Whitehouse, 2015: A 
Very Good Year for . . . Warm Weather, GLOB. WARMING POLICY FORUM (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.thegwpf.com/2015-a-very-good-year-for-warm-weather/ [https://perma.cc/MM4H-A6TW]. 
See generally John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the 
Scientific Literature, 8 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 4–6 (2013) (analyzing recent historic trends of glob-
al warming opinions in the climate scientist community). 
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It is assumed that international agreements on greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
production and sequestration will not prevent a significant increase in the 
earth’s temperature over the next hundred years.20 The residence time of 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) in the atmosphere, and the thermal inertia of the 
oceans, assure that sea level rise caused by global warming will continue 
for centuries after the earth’s temperature and GHG gas levels reach equi-
librium.21 Even with rapid and successful control of GHG production, man-
kind will need to adapt to rising temperatures for at least the next hundred 
years and to sea level rise for at least 500 years.22 Despite these timeframes, 
many national environmental groups back coastal restoration plans that ef-
fectively deny climate change because they cannot succeed if the sea level 
is rising.23 Such restoration mythologies depend on returning to a steady 
state earth.24 
We must accept that climate change is the norm. The climate will not 
return to the late Holocene standstill for centuries, if ever. We should miti-
gate climate change to smooth the path for adaptation, but we must develop 
long-term environmental policy based on a changing climate. We cannot 
focus only on mitigation in hopes that the earth will return to a steady state. 
II. IS THERE AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN CLIMATE CHANGE? 
The purpose of insurance is to allow mitigation of future risks: the in-
sured exchanges its risk of a large future loss for smaller periodic payments 
(premiums) paid to the insurance company.25 Property-casualty insurance 
covers risks such as fire, theft, extreme weather damage, automobile acci-
dent injuries, property damage, being sued for liability by another person, 
and other risks of financial loss.26 Life insurance pays for the losses caused 
by the insured’s death and medical care insurance pays for medical care 
when the insured is sick or injured.27 Actuarially sound insurance requires 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Justin Gillis & Somini Sengupta, Limited Progress Seen Even as More Nations Step Up 
on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/28/world/limited-progress-
seen-even-as-more-nations-step-up-on-climate.html. 
 21 Michiel Schaeffer et al., Long-Term Sea Level Rise Implied by 1.5°C and 2°C Warming 
Levels, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 867, 867 (2012). 
 22 Id. 
 23 D.M. Kennedy, Tectonic and Geomorphic Evolution of Estuaries and Coasts, in TREATISE 
ON ESTUARINE AND COASTAL SCIENCE 37, 38 (2011) (describing how the coast line advances and 
retreats tens to hundreds of miles with changes in sea level). 
 24 See id. 
 25 AM. INS. ASS’N, PROPERTY–CASUALTY INSURANCE BASICS 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter PROPER-
TY—CASUALTY]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 G.C. Orros & J.M. Webber, Medical Expenses Insurance—An Actuarial Review, 115 J. 
INST. ACTUARIES 169, 169–269 (1988). 
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that the insured’s risks be understood well enough that a premium can be set 
that will turn a profit for the insurer.28 Risk is priced by looking at the data 
from a large number of parties with the same characteristics as those to be 
insured: the law of large numbers.29 If the probability and severity are hard 
to determine, the premium will be higher or the insurer may not be willing 
to provide coverage.30 Ironically, risks that are not anticipated by the insur-
er, popularly known as black swan risks, may be covered, even if they are 
potentially catastrophic.31 
The core problem with using insurance to incentivize adaptation to cli-
mate change is the mismatch between the policy term for insurance and the 
timeframe that defines climate. Property-casualty insurance policies usually 
have a one-year term.32 This allows premiums to be adjusted if the estimated 
probability of the insured risks change, or if market conditions change the 
other factors (capital investment returns, marketing goals, etc.) that influ-
ence premium pricing.33 Climate is defined as the thirty-year average of 
metrological events (weather).34 Once there was substantial evidence for 
climate change, the standard stayed a thirty-year average, but the average is 
recalculated every ten years.35 Insurable events are the consequences of ex-
treme weather such as hurricanes, tornados, droughts, and floods. A given 
extreme weather event cannot be attributed to climate change because the 
climate normal and climate models do not provide information that is fine 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See PROPERTY—CASUALTY, supra note 25, at 5. 
 29 Id. at 1. 
 30 TRISTAN NGUYEN, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (UNISDR), INSURABIL-
ITY OF CATASTROPHE RISKS AND GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN INSURANCE SOLUTIONS 4 
(2013) (noting that terrorism is an example of risk with a difficult to predict probability and se-
verity). 
 31 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 
210–11 (2007) (explaining the “black swan” concept); see, e.g., Scott Ross, Risk Management and 
Insurance Industry Perspective on Cosmic Hazards, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC AND PLANETARY 
DEFENSE 1085, 1086 (2015) (noting that the risk of damage from comets, asteroids, and other 
bodies from space are currently covered under conventional property causality insurance; there are 
currently few claims worldwide from such events, so insurers do not worry about them, and any-
thing that would increase the risk would likely cause them to require special (expensive) riders or 
be excluded altogether). 
 32 See Dwight Jaffee et al., Long-Term Property Insurance, 29 J. INS. REG. 167, 171 (2010). 
 33 See id. at 168. 
 34 Anthony Arguez et al., NOAA’s 1981–2010 U.S. Climate Normals: An Overview, 93 BULL. 
AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1687, 1687 (2012). 
 35 Anthony Arguez & Russell S. Vose, The Definition of the Standard WMO Climate Normal: 
The Key to Deriving Alternative Climate Normals, 92 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 699, 
699 (2011) (recognizing that although the climate normal is a historical reference, it is used for 
prospective purposes). 
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grained enough in time and space.36 Although global warming will increase 
the probability and severity of extreme weather events over time, year-to-
year property-casualty insurance only insures individual extreme weather 
events, not climate trends.37 
Attributing specific extreme weather events to global warming is fur-
ther complicated by the inherent variability of weather and even climate.38 
Extreme weather risk is discussed in terms of 100, 500, and 1000-year 
events, but reliable basic weather data extends back only to the late 1700s in 
places with long-term settlements.39 In large parts of the world, including 
the United States, reliable data on large areas only goes back a hundred 
years or less, and weather radar and satellite data dates to the early 1960s.40 
Determining if an event is a 100-year event for a given location would re-
quire a good data record for several hundreds of years to see how often the 
event recurred. 500 and 1000-year events would take correspondingly long-
er.41 In the face of this limited data, extreme events seem to be classified as 
less frequent than they appear in the historic record. For example, the Army 
Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) classified Hurricane Katrina as a 400-year 
storm. 42 Louisiana, however, is hit by a hurricane on average every 2.8 
years, and Hurricane Katrina was not the most deadly storm to hit the 
state.43 Within the last 2000 years, the west and the Great Plains have seen 
decades-long droughts that are much worse than the Dust Bowl in the 1930s 
and the recent drought in California.44 Within this same period, the Missis-
sippi River has had megafloods that greatly exceed what we assume is a 
500-year flood.45 
                                                                                                                           
 36 D.S. Shriner et al., North America, in REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: AN AS-
SESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY 253, 264–65 (R.T. Watson et al. eds., 1998). 
 37 Gerald A. Meehl et al., Trends in Extreme Weather and Climate Events: Issues Related to 
Modeling Extremes in Projections of Future Climate Change, 81 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL 
SOC’Y 427, 433–34 (2000). 
 38 See Michael E. Mann, Climate Over the Past Two Millennia, 35 ANN. REV. EARTH PLANET 
SCI. 111, 112 (2007). 
 39 Petr Dobrovolný et al., Monthly, Seasonal and Annual Temperature Reconstructions for 
Central Europe Derived from Documentary Evidence and Instrumental Records Since AD 1500, 
101 CLIMATIC CHANGE 69, 79 (2010). 
 40 Gary Davis, History of the NOAA Satellite Program, J. APPLIED REMOTE SENSING, Jan. 25, 
2007, at 4. 
 41 D.R. Easterling et al., Observed Variability and Trends in Extreme Climate Events: A Brief 
Review, 81 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 417, 418 (2000). 
 42  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, LOUISIANA COASTAL PROTECTION AND RESTORATION 
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: STRUCTURAL PLAN COMPONENT APPENDIX 1–2 (2009). 
 43 DAVID ROTH, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., LOUISIANA HURRICANE HISTORY 3, 7 (2010). 
 44 Connie A. Woodhouse & Jonathan T. Overpeck, 2000 Years of Drought Variability in the 
Central United States, 79 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 2693, 2710 (1998). 
 45 See Paul Brown et al., Marine Evidence for Episodic Holocene Megafloods in North Amer-
ica and the Northern Gulf of Mexico, 14 PALEOCEANOGRAPHY 498, 508 (1999). 
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Thus, an ordinary property-casualty insurance policy only views 
weather through its one-year frame of reference because climate is defined 
as a thirty-year decadally-adjusted average. Even if extreme events are be-
ing exacerbated by climate change, the inherent variability in weather will 
mask that on a year-to-year basis. The property owner will see the year-to-
year cost of the insurance, but that will not communicate increasing future 
risk, which would be necessary for the insurance to drive adaptation to cli-
mate change. What would be necessary is an insurable event with clear fu-
ture risk signal. It must have effects that are routinely insured so the product 
will fit into the existing insurance market. If possible, it should be struc-
tured as an existing product so that the market can properly understand and 
rate it. The starting point is to analyze the currently understood risks posed 
by climate change to determine which, if any, fit within these criteria. 
A. Ocean Acidification 
There are two separate classes of risk from increased carbon dioxide 
(“CO2”) in the atmosphere. The first is the direct chemical effect on water 
bodies.46 As the concentration (partial pressure) of CO2 in the atmosphere 
increases, the amount of CO2 that will dissolve in water increases.47 This 
increases the concentration of carbonate in the water and decreases the pH 
(makes the water more acidic).48 The pH is directly linked to the partial 
pressure of CO2 in the atmosphere, so the pH at any given partial pressure 
of CO2 can be known precisely.49 Thus, it is possible to know the pH with 
some accuracy for any projected level of CO2 in the atmosphere.50 Alt-
hough the pH can be accurately predicted, the effects of the pH change on 
natural systems are not well characterized.51 
Decreasing pH affects the ability of organisms such as oysters and cor-
al to build shells from calcium carbonate (CaCO3) and the metabolism of 
some non-shell building organisms.52 It can change aquatic ecosystems in 
ways that are not well understood and which could impact species that are 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Khan M.G. Mostofa et al., Balancing of Ocean Acidification by Superoxide Redox Chemis-
try?, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 11,380, 11,380 (2013). 
 47 See Frank J. Millero, Thermodynamics of the Carbon Dioxide System in the Oceans, 59 
GEOCHIMICA ET COSMOCHIMICA ACTA 661, 661 (1995). 
 48 See id. at 661–62. 
 49 See id. at 662. 
 50 See id. 
 51 Kristy J. Kroeker et al., Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine Organisms: Quantifying 
Sensitivities and Interaction with Warming, 19 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 1884, 1886 (2013). 
 52 Frédéric Gazeau et al., Impact of Elevated CO2 on Shellfish Calcification, 34 GEOPHYSI-
CAL RES. LETTERS 1, 3 (2007). 
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important for human nutrition.53 These changes do not affect the climate, 
but the climate—through water temperature changes—will affect their se-
verity.54 The ecological effects could disrupt fisheries, destroy coral reefs, 
and have other effects, even positive effects, which we do not understand.55 
Of these, the only one with an insurable economic value would be effects 
on fisheries.56 Although a coral reef may have many important ecological 
values, these are not traditional property values that fit into an insurance 
model.57 It is also not subject to adaptation measures—you cannot move the 
Great Barrier Reef. Schemes to buffer anything but very small reefs from 
acidification are implausible. There is no clear insurable interest and no ra-
tionale for using insurance as risk communication for ocean acidification. 
B. Heat, Drought, and Fire 
California is a good example of the impact of increased temperatures 
on existing rain patterns. At the time this Article was written, California was 
in the fourth year of a profound drought.58 Based on measurements of soil 
water and other indices of available water, 2014 was the driest year in the 
1200 years of available California tree ring climate data.59 Yet several years 
have had less rainfall than 2014.60 The extreme drought is driven by the 
combination of very high temperatures and low rain.61 Both the tempera-
tures and the rainfall events have been seen in the climate record; this is the 
first time they have been seen together.62 This does not prove that the tem-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See COMM. ON THE DEV. OF AN INTEGRATED SCI. STRATEGY FOR OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 
MONITORING, RESEARCH & IMPACTS ASSESSMENT, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OCEAN ACIDI-
FICATION: A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF A CHANGING OCEAN 59–83 
(2010) (discussing the impacts of ocean acidification generally, and how the ecological effects of 
ocean acidification are not totally understood). 
 54 See Joan A. Kleypas et al., The Impact of ENSO on Coral Heat Stress in the Western Equa-
torial Pacific, 21 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 2525, 2525 (2015) (discussing how coral bleach-
ing—the loss of the symbiotic algae necessary for health coral—is exacerbated by higher ocean 
temperatures, further weakening coral already suffering from acidification). 
 55 See CHRISTOPHER B. FIELD ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 17 (2014). 
 56 See id. 
 57 See James Spurgeon, The Economic Valuation of Coral Reefs, 24 MARINE POLLUTION 
BULL. 529, 530 (1992). 
 58 See Anne F. Van Loon et al., Drought in the Anthropocene, 9 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 89, 89 
(2016). 
 59 See Daniel L. Swain et al., The Extraordinary California Drought of 2013/2014: Charac-
ter, Context, and the Role of Climate Change, 95 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y S3, S3 
(2014). 
 60  Daniel Griffin & Kevin J. Anchukaitis, How Unusual Is the 2012–2014 California 
Drought?, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 9017, 9021 (2014). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. at 9022. 
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perature extremes were due to climate change but it is clear that the conflu-
ence of low rain and high temperatures will be more likely to happen with 
global warming.63 Although 2014 may be the driest year, there have been 
longer droughts during the relatively recent past.64 
The drought has lengthened the normal fire season and has exacerbat-
ed the fires that start.65 Many trees are dying from the drought, which al-
lows fires to burn mature trees that normally survive fires.66 Rather than 
clearing the brush, these fires are leaving the land barren and increasing the 
risk of floods and landslides when rains return.67 The muddy runoff will 
have severe impacts on the ecology of the streams that run through the fire 
zones.68 Fires also destroy homes and communities, providing classic insur-
ance risks. 
The drought has hurt agriculture in California—the falling water tables 
have left some communities without running water. 69  Cities have been 
forced to impose restrictions on water use and San Diego has activated a 
desalination plant to provide supplemental drinking water.70 Although the 
agricultural impact on the California economy has been projected at $2.7 
billion for 2015, this is a small part of the state’s economy.71 This does not 
account for the human suffering caused by the fires or the loss of running 
water for some communities. If the drought continues, the cost may in-
crease substantially as ground water levels fall below the reach of more 
communities. The impact of droughts in less wealthy countries is much 
more profound. 
The Syrian refugee crisis is perhaps the first modern climate-driven 
large-scale population migration.72 It should not be surprising that it has been 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Amir AghaKouchak et al., Global Warming and Changes in Risk of Concurrent Cli-
mate Extremes: Insights from the 2014 California Drought, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 
8847, 8847 (2014); see also Noah S. Diffenbaugh et al., Anthropogenic Warming Has Increased 
Drought Risk in California, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3931, 3931 (2015) (discussing that 
global warming is likely the proximate cause of California’s current multiyear drought). 
 64 Griffin & Anchukaitis, supra note 60, at 9021. 
 65 Diffenbaugh et al., supra note 63, at 3931. 
 66 Gregory P. Asner et al., Progressive Forest Canopy Water Loss During the 2012–2015 
California Drought, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E249, E252 (2016). 
 67 See Dennis L. Lynch, What Do Forest Fires Really Cost?, 102 J. FORESTRY 42, 42 (2004). 
 68 See id. at 48. 
 69 RICHARD HOWITT ET AL., U.C. DAVIS CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCI., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE 2015 DROUGHT FOR CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE 1, 18 (2015). 
 70 Seawater Desalination, SAN DIEGO CTY. WATER AUTH., http://www.sdcwa.org/seawater-
desalination [https://perma.cc/BT3Y-UMNM]. 
 71 RICHARD HOWITT ET AL., supra note 69, at 10. 
 72 Colin P. Kelley et al., Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Re-
cent Syrian Drought, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3241, 3241 (2015) (“There is evidence that the 
2007–2010 drought contributed to the conflict in Syria. It was the worst drought in the instrumen-
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intermediated by the breakdown of civil society and civil war. This trans-
forms the fleeing population from economic migrants with few rights under 
international law to political refugees, who are entitled to entry into other 
countries as well as support.73 The destabilization of economies, especially in 
the belt from the Mediterranean across India to Bangladesh, is a major na-
tional security threat as climate destabilizes economies and the ensuing politi-
cal refugees stream into nuclear-armed hostile neighboring countries.74 
Drought and its consequences will likely be more common in the fu-
ture as the climate warms, but their occurrence will continue to be difficult 
to predict with sufficient certainty over adequate time to properly incorpo-
rate them into insurance.75 Catastrophic effects, such as civil war and mas-
sive migration, are in the nature of gray swans—novel and beyond our ex-
perience, but foreseeable. Being foreseeable is not the same as being subject 
to statistical characterization as to both occurrence and severity, which is 
necessary for insurance.76 
C. Inland and River Flooding 
Some scholars prefer to use the term climate disruption rather than cli-
mate change.77 The intent is to emphasize that global warming increases the 
variability of climate.78 Because climate is the thirty-year running average of 
                                                                                                                           
tal record, causing widespread crop failure and a mass migration of farming families to urban 
centers. Century-long observed trends in precipitation, temperature, and sea-level pressure, sup-
ported by climate model results, strongly suggest that anthropogenic forcing has increased the 
probability of severe and persistent droughts in this region, and made the occurrence of a 3-year 
drought as severe as that of 2007–2010 2 to 3 times more likely than by natural variability alone. 
We conclude that human influences on the climate system are implicated in the current Syrian 
conflict.”). 
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weather, it is not variable at the level of individual extreme weather events.79 
It is weather that is disrupted, in the sense that its short-term variability is in-
creased.80 Thus 100-year floods might become 20-year floods, and 1000-year 
events might become 100-year events. There are many drivers of the in-
creased variability. The simplest is that warmer air holds more water than 
cooler air.81 The warmer the air, the greater potential rainfall as the moisture 
condenses from the air.82 The paleoclimate record for megafloods also indi-
cates that small shifts in climate during the Holocene have had profound im-
pacts on flooding.83 Paleoclimate data can also help establish that a recent 
event is outside of the long-term record, strengthening the argument that it 
has been influenced by recent climate change.84 Although river flooding will 
likely become more frequent, so will droughts that reduce river flow.85 Until 
these patterns are better established, it is hard to characterize the long-term 
risk profile that would be necessary for insurance. 
D. Sea Level Rise 
Before climate disruption and climate change there was global warm-
ing. Although global warming as terminology has been displaced to stress 
that the impact is much broader than just an increase in temperature, the 
core process is the atmosphere retaining more heat due to the accumulation 
of CO2, along with methane and several other industrial gases.86 The in-
creased heat in the lower atmosphere is transferred to the land and the 
ocean.87 The ocean is the primary heat sink. It has a much larger heat capac-
ity than the atmosphere so that it heats and cools slowly, damping out varia-
tions in atmospheric temperature.88 The deep ocean is approximately the 
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temperature of freezing seawater, -1.90°C.89 Winds and currents change the 
mixing rate between the warm surface waters and the deep, freezing water, 
which reduces the surface temperature and can cool the atmosphere.90 The 
net thermal energy in the ocean continues to increase because the surface 
heat is transferred to deep water.91 
Sea level is determined by the volume of the ocean basin, the tempera-
ture of the water (water increases in volume as it warms), and the amount of 
water in the ocean.92 Although the volume of the ocean basin changes with 
crustal plate movement, this is a very slow process and has been effectively 
stable for several million years. 93  In the early solar system, asteroids 
brought water to the earth.94 This process still continues at a low rate, but 
not enough to affect ocean volume over human timeframes.95 The only sig-
nificant source of additional water in the ocean is ice on land, primarily in 
Antarctica, Greenland, and mountain glaciers. 96 Warmer air and warmer 
water cause the ice to melt faster than it accumulates and raises sea level.97 
Thus, sea level is a thermometer for the earth, rising as the temperature ris-
es.98 Sea level has been rising for more than a hundred years, and the rate of 
rise has been increasing.99 Although the future rate of increase in sea level 
rise is uncertain, even the most conservative estimates show significant im-
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pact on low lying coastal areas by 2100.100 This lower bound of sea level 
rise is the most certain and clear risk associated with climate change.101 
1. Sea Level Rise Driven Coastal Retreat 
The location of beaches, barrier islands, and coastal wetlands is de-
fined by sea level; as sea level rises, they migrate inland.102 In the case of 
beaches and barrier islands, if there is inadequate sand available, they will 
disappear as sea level rises.103 Sand can be lost naturally as shore currents 
change with sea level rise. On many beaches in the United States, sand was 
mined for use in construction, leaving inadequate sand to sustain the beach 
in the face of sea level rise.104 The Outer Banks of North Carolina are an 
example of high value real estate that is already being lost to sea level 
rise.105 Although coastal wetlands tend to retreat differently than beaches 
do, wetlands, including those that define river deltas such as the Mississippi 
River Delta and the delta that forms Bangladesh, also retreat inland with sea 
level rise.106 
River deltas are at special risk from sea level rise.107 They are the loca-
tion of many of the world’s great cities and some of the most productive 
farmland.108 What is popularly called the delta starts at the open water at the 
edge and extends inland and upland.109 Moving inland on a natural delta, at 
the edges there are coastal wetlands of salt marsh, which give way to fresh 
water marshes, which transition to wet forests such as cypress, and then to 
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upland forests.110 This green zone extending to the water sits on the geolog-
ic delta, which is an upside down mountain of sediment that has been ac-
cumulating for tens to hundreds of millions of years.111 In the case of the 
Mississippi Delta, it was the weakness of the crust that allowed the delta to 
form by accommodating the ever-increasing load of sediment by subsid-
ing.112 The subsidence is driven by the existing load of sediment so that any 
parts of the delta that are not being actively supplied with sediment rapidly 
sink below sea level.113 
The location of the coastal edge of the delta is determined by the level 
of the ocean—all the major river deltas across the world date back to be-
tween 8500 and 6500 years ago, when sea level from the melting of the last 
ice age stabilized.114 The deltas were far offshore during the glacial maxi-
mum—the point of maximum ice coverage during a glacial cycle—when 
the ocean was more than a hundred meters lower.115 They retreated inland 
as sea level rose, and what we see as the current river deltas built when sea 
level stopped rising.116 The coastal edge of deltas has been following sea 
level for millions of years as sea level rises and falls with the formation and 
melting of the ice pack.117 Deltas’ coastal edges will recede as sea level ris-
es with global warming.118 Because many are very flat, the rate of land loss 
will be high as the coast retreats inland to keep pace with sea level.119 De-
spite a long history of engineering efforts to hold back the retreat of the 
shoreline and to restore lost land, none of these efforts can be successful in 
the face of sea level rise.120 
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Coastal retreat is a long-term and predictable process, to the extent that 
sea level rise can be anticipated, but the bigger threat to communities is how 
the baseline increase in sea level increases the reach of storm-driven coastal 
flooding.121 As sea level rises, the impact of any given storm is increased.122 
The worst storms are tropical cyclonic storms because they build the high-
est surge.123 These affect the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States, 
and the coasts of most Asian countries (they are called typhoons in the 
western Pacific and hurricanes in the Atlantic and eastern Pacific).124 As 
they drift farther north they lose their tropical designation because of the 
loss of energy from warm waters.125 Although Hurricane Sandy had become 
an extratropical storm by the time it hit the northeast, it demonstrated the 
damage that a tropical storm can do even when far from tropical waters.126 
As a consequence of sea level rise, flooding during storms will neces-
sarily increase. This will extend flooding farther inland and deeper in areas 
that have flooded in the past.127 If there are areas protected by barriers such 
as sea walls or levees, it will increase the chance that the barriers will be 
overtopped or breached.128 This catastrophic increase in risk is called the 
levee or escalator effect, because the existence of the levees escalates the 
risk of flooding by leading people to discount the risk they face.129 Alt-
hough warming the ocean may increase the frequency and strength of hurri-
canes, it will clearly allow them to maintain strength farther into cooler wa-
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ters. This will increase the risk to more northern areas and might extend the 
length of the hurricane season. Most areas of the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic 
coasts are already at excessive risk for hurricane damage, complicating at-
tributing the additional risk to climate change.130 
Many major cities are on bays where navigable rivers enter the ocean, 
or are relatively close to the coast, up a navigable river. Sea level rise will 
deepen and expand the bays, and will reduce the head (slope) of the river. 
This will make it harder for the river to drain. For any given river-flooding 
event, an increase in sea level will increase the flooding at the bay and up-
river. Sea level rise, combined with larger climate change driven rain 
events, will potentiate the flooding beyond historical norms. Thus, flooding 
risk on rivers near the coast can increase dramatically with climate change. 
This will make the risk profile and insurance issues on properties on those 
rivers look more like the risk profile on coastal properties. 
2. The Insurable Interest in Sea Level Rise 
These coastal and riverine effects of sea level rise are the best under-
stood effects of climate change.131 They are already well established by the 
past hundred years of sea level rise, and there is extensive geologic and 
paleoclimate information about migration of the coast during periods of 
changing sea level in the past.132 There is uncertainty regarding how much 
the rate of sea level rise will increase over the next hundred years, but that 
is a question of timing more than of the ultimate level the ocean will reach 
as its temperature equilibrates with the increased level of heat retention by 
the atmosphere.133 Coastal properties are at risk from current sea level rise 
and storms, and this risk will rise with sea level and ocean temperature. As 
the consequence of climate change with the most predictable risks that fit 
within the existing property casualty insurance framework, it is the best can-
didate for insurance products that encourage adaptation to climate change.134 
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It is also one of the highest risks as measured by the value of property and 
the number of lives at risk.135 
Using population numbers from 2000, there are 600,000,000 people 
worldwide living in the low elevation coastal zone (“LECZ”).136 A majority 
of those people live on river deltas and flat lands that are subject to the most 
dangerous storm risk—tropical cyclones (hurricanes and typhoons). 137 
Through natural geology and bad land use practices, especially ground wa-
ter withdrawal, most of these areas are also subsiding faster than sea level is 
rising.138 They are already subject to catastrophic flooding, a risk that sub-
sidence exacerbates every year.139 Even in a steady state earth, we would be 
facing large disasters each year because of the concentration of risk and 
economic development in these areas.140 As sea level rises, it may make 
economic sense to defend some LECZ areas with favorable geology and 
high value real estate, but much of the property in the LECZ will have to be 
abandoned. 
The core policy question for LECZ properties subject to tropical cy-
clones is whether they will end through punctuated catastrophe (periodic 
catastrophic storm flooding punctuated with cycles of rebuilding until a 
given storm is sufficiently catastrophic that the body politic is no longer 
willing to finance rebuilding). At least in the United States, where the com-
mercial interests will see even greater insurance costs, it is likely that there 
will also be a long-term economic decline during this period as major em-
ployers move out of the high risk zone. 
New Orleans is an example of the punctuated catastrophe cycle. In the 
author’s opinion, the process of retreat should have started in 1965 with 
Hurricane Betsy, and certainly after Hurricane Katrina in 2005.141 Despite 
the city’s rebirth myth, jobs data has shown a continuing shift to low wage 
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service jobs throughout the Katrina recovery.142 This shows the ongoing 
loss of major commercial activity due to increased insurance pressure and 
the risks of doing business in a high-risk zone. The city’s economy will con-
tinue to decline, as it has since the 1950s, as it awaits the next catastrophic 
storm.143 A properly constructed climate change insurance product could 
create incentives to break the punctuated catastrophe cycle. 
III. BUILDING A NEW MODEL FOR INSURING COASTAL RISKS 
In an ideal world, everyone would be wealthy enough to make an in-
formed choice between buying insurance and bearing the risk of loss for 
given risks. The state would be indifferent as to whether individuals pur-
chase insurance because the individual would be able to bear the risk of loss 
and not become a burden to the state or others. Few families in the United 
States are so wealthy, so the government has become involved in insurance 
and insurance regulation.144 The government may require the purchase of 
insurance when an individual’s inability to bear the risk of loss will be a 
burden on society.145 The government may do this through its parens patri-
ae interest in the welfare of the insured or those the insured might injure.146 
The government also has an interest in its own finances when individuals 
require medical care, social services, or other benefits that they cannot af-
ford.147 The states require liability insurance for automobile drivers; and the 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See MARLA NELSON ET AL., DATA CTR., PERSISTENT LOW WAGES IN NEW ORLEANS’ 
ECONOMIC RESURGENCE: POLICIES FOR IMPROVING EARNINGS FOR THE WORKING POOR 2 
(2015). 
 143  See 2000 Census: US Municipalities over 50,000: Ranked by 2000 Population, DE-
MOGRAPHIA, http://www.demographia.com/db-uscity98.htm (noting that by year 2000, New Orle-
ans was the thirty-first largest city in the United States); Population of the 100 Largest Cities and 
Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (1998), https://
www.census.gov/library/working-papers/1998/demo/POP-twps0027.html [https://perma.cc/T2Q5-
9HAP] (describing how in 1860, New Orleans was the sixth largest city in the United States; in 
1950, it was the sixteenth largest; and in 1990, it was the twenty-fourth largest). 
 144 See generally Lisa Dubay et al., The Uninsured and the Affordability of Health Insurance 
Coverage, 26 HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2007, at w22–25 (discussing that the phenomena has been most 
studied with health insurance—Medicare was passed because the elderly could not afford medical 
insurance or medical care, Medicaid was for indigent persons, and even with these programs a 
large number of Americans could not afford medical care and remained uninsured before the Af-
fordable Care Act). 
 145 See generally Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability 
Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, 36 RAND J. ECON. 63, 64–65 (2005) (dis-
cussing that insurance tends to incentivize to reduce risk). 
 146 Edward P. Richards, The Historical Background for Mandatory Reporting Laws in Public 
Health, in MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF SEVERE CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT 105, 110 (2015). 
 147 Jack Hadley & John Holahan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who 
Pays for It?, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2003, at W3-66, W3-69. A 2003 study showed that the unin-
 
2016] Applying Life Insurance Principles to Coastal Property Insurance  445 
federal mortgage insurance system requires property-casualty insurance on 
all mortgaged homes and flood insurance on those that are in the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) designated floodplains.148 The 
Affordable Care Act requires that most individuals carry medical insur-
ance.149 
When the government requires insurance, politics and fairness demand 
that it try to make the insurance affordable for the less wealthy. This can be 
done in three ways. First, the government can maintain the insurance as a 
private market product, but limit individualized rating decisions so that the 
risk is spread over a larger population. This forces insureds at lower risk to 
subsidize those at higher risk, thus reducing their insurance costs. Second, it 
can subsidize the cost of insurance with public funds to directly lower the 
cost below actuarially sound levels. Third, it can provide a pure public ben-
efit without using the insurance model. The government uses all three of 
these approaches in its current approach to coastal properties.150 
A. The Existing Coastal Insurance and Compensation System 
1. Wind Damage Insurance 
In the pure private insurance states, which are mostly not subject to 
hurricanes, insurance regulators may force companies to spread the coastal 
risk over a larger pool of insureds to keep the coastal policies more afforda-
ble.151 In the major states subject to hurricanes—including Florida, Texas, 
and Louisiana—the states have set up captive carriers to provide subsidized 
wind coverage for coastal areas.152 These citizens plans are intended to keep 
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coverage affordable, to protect real estate values, and to allow existing 
homeowners to continue affording coverage.153 The subsidy is funded by 
statutory provisions, which allow a surcharge against all insurance plans in 
the state.154 This is effectively a contingent tax to pay off the bonds that 
would be issued to pay claims after a major storm. The number of insureds 
in these plans exploded after Hurricane Katrina, but their economic viability 
has not yet been tested by a major storm.155 This subsidy also externalizes 
the cost of the risk and mitigates the risk communication effect of the insur-
ance.156 In states where the rates for citizen’s policies are still high, there is 
some incentive to adapt, either through reinforcing the house if that will 
earn a discount on the premium or by moving out of the flood zone. 
2. The National Flood Insurance Program 
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) provides residential 
coverage up to $250,000 for the structure and $100,000 for contents, and up 
to $500,000 for business structures and $500,000 for business contents.157 
Because flood losses are seldom complete losses, $250,000 is adequate for 
most residential property covered by the NFIP.158 Larger business will sup-
plement this coverage through the private insurance and reinsurance mark-
ers. 159 This supports a private insurance market for flood insurance that 
could be drawn on as an alternative to the NFIP.160 The NFIP has been 
widely criticized for subsidizing flood insurance rates and for subsidizing 
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the rebuilding of flooded properties in high risk areas.161 It has also been 
found that the program shifts money from less affluent taxpayers to more 
affluent coastal landowners.162 
In addition to the economic problems with the NFIP, there is a funda-
mental risk assessment flaw. As discussed previously, the 100-year flood 
standard tends to underestimate the actual risk of flooding.163 (This is dis-
tinct from the misperception that every major flood is a 100 year flood.)164 
The main problem with the 100-year standard, however, is that it ignores all 
risk beyond the 100-year flood. 165 Properties outside the 100-year flood 
zone are not subject to floodplain building restrictions and property owners 
are not required to purchase flood insurance as a condition for mortgages.166 
If the property is behind a levee that the Army Corps of Engineers (the 
“Corps”) certifies as providing 100-year flood protection, then insurance is 
rated as if there is no flood risk from hurricanes or river flooding.167 This 
100-year standard, which is meant to be a risk communication tool, is now a 
design criterion: the Corps designs levees, such as those built in New Orle-
ans after Hurricane Katrina, to withstand the 100-year flood.168 
There is no consideration of the 101-year risk, the 200-year risk, or the 
500-year risk. It is also assumed that certified levees are never breached. 
Thus, houses ten feet below sea level in New Orleans, which were flooded 
to the rafters in 1965 and in 2005, are underwritten as having no hurricane 
flood risk.169 An objective risk analysis would include all the risks beyond 
the 100-year storm, including the probability that the levees would fail dur-
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ing a 100-year or smaller event.170 For the purposes of this Article, the NFIP 
systematically underestimates the risk of flooding, to the point of denying 
flood risk in situations where the risk is obvious and catastrophic.171 For the 
flood risks that are recognized, the policies are underpriced and rates are not 
adjusted after flooding if the property was grandfathered into the NFIP.172 
This prevents adjusting rates as sea level rise increases the risk of flooding.173 
Rather than encourage adaptation, the NFIP encourages high-risk develop-
ment.174 
3. FEMA and the Stafford Act 
When individual home or business owners have an underinsured or un-
insured event, they generally bear the risk of the loss. They may get access 
to low interest loans for rebuilding, but there is no systematic federal pro-
gram to shelter them from the consequences of being under or uninsured.175 
When a community suffers a major disaster, the federal government will of-
ten come in and protect homeowners who have voluntarily chosen to forgo 
insurance coverage, along with those who could not afford insurance cover-
age.176 In flooding events, the government will even provide funding to allow 
the inadequately insured to rebuild in the same place where they were flood-
ed.177 This defeats even the limited provisions of the NFIP on rebuilding in 
high-risk areas.178 
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The most extensive example of direct aid to underinsured homeowners 
after a coastal flooding event at the time of this Article is the Louisiana 
Road Home Program instituted after Hurricane Katrina. 179 This program 
was intended to help persons whose homes were destroyed by Hurricane 
Katrina find new housing.180 Although the State of Louisiana tried to re-
quire that the money only be used for rebuilding in the same high-risk 
place, the federal government allowed homeowners to also use the money 
to relocate.181 The vast majority of homeowners in New Orleans and many 
others in high-risk areas choose to use the money to rebuild in the same 
place.182 Rather than seeing this as a disaster, most commentators saw re-
building in these high-risk areas as evidence of community resilience.183 
From the perspective of short-term human suffering, disaster relief that 
tries to reestablish the status quo is politically irresistible. Calls for reloca-
tion will draw scorn from local politicians who worry that their constituen-
cies will shrink.184 Social justice advocates will argue, correctly, that the 
poor will suffer disproportionately from relocation schemes.185 The home-
owners themselves will resist efforts at relocation as they believe that they 
will not flood again—however naïve that belief.186 
4. Insurance as Risk Communication 
The existing coastal risk insurance and compensation system is intend-
ed to shield property owners and communities from the full costs of living 
in a high-risk zone.187 This eliminates the critical role insurance can play in 
communicating and managing risks.188 Property casualty insurance has a 
long history of combining insurance and risk management to reduce and 
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control risks.189 An early example was the work of the Hartford Steam Boil-
er Insurance & Inspection Co. with the steam boiler engineering community 
in setting standards for steam boilers, which were a major risk for fire and 
explosions in buildings in the 1800s. 190 The insurer provided insurance, 
which was contingent on meeting boiler safety standards.191 This reduced 
the risk of property damage and injury to the insured, as well as the cost of 
the insurance. 
More generally, actuarially sound insurance is a direct economic indi-
cator of the risk of an activity or the probability of damage to property. If an 
insured is buying coverage from a market that has not been distorted by 
regulation intended to create social benefits, the cost of insurance is a pow-
erful communicator of risk. 192 For example, the cost and availability of 
products liability insurance affects the decision to market and design prod-
ucts. The design and location of buildings are affected by the cost of insur-
ing them. Rather than saving money on the initial construction by designing 
to a minimum wind load, the owner may build a more expensive but strong-
er building to gain a discount in the yearly insurance bill. 
Risk communication is distorted when the insurer prices risk below its 
real cost.193 Insurers may do this for short periods to gain market share.194 
Part of the instability in the medical malpractice insurance markets in the 
1970s was driven by insurers entering the market with low rates to attract 
policy holders, then dramatically raising the rates in later policy years when 
it was difficult to switch carriers.195 Much more commonly, the rate struc-
ture is distorted by legislative and regulatory decisions intended to use the 
insurance system for other social welfare purposes.196 Citizen’s wind insur-
ance programs spread the risk of coastal wind damage over the entire state 
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to make the insurance more affordable, which reduces the risk signal to 
coastal property owners.197 The NFIP reduces the risk signal by having the 
government subsidize premium costs with general tax revenue. 198 These 
programs, combined with disaster relief through the Stafford Act, FEMA, 
and direct appropriations effectively remove the risk signal that could in-
centivize adaptation to sea level rise.199 
B. The Structure of Human Life Insurance 
An insurance system for incentivizing adaption to rising sea level must 
communicate the increasing future risk while still functioning as a conven-
tional property-casualty insurance policy. Although it is impossible to know 
precisely when low lying properties will be lost to flooding or catastrophic 
storms, it is clear that at some point in the future they will be gone. Tradi-
tional property-casualty insurance is written on the assumption that the 
property will continue in existence for an indefinite period and will face the 
same risks during this period. The best-known insurance product that ex-
plicitly deals with the lifetime problem is term life insurance. 
Life insurance is a simple bet: the insured bets the insurance company 
that he will die sooner than the insurance company thinks he will.200 If the 
insured dies during the term of the policy, the total amount of the policy is 
paid out.201 The insurer wins—makes a profit on the policy—if the insured 
lives longer than the term of the policy if it is a fixed term, or lives longer 
than the predicted age of death that the premiums are based on if the policy 
is still in force at death. The insured wins—collects more money than the 
discounted net present day value of the policy—by dying early.202 
1. Pricing Life Insurance 
The premium for a given amount of life insurance—the terms of the 
bet—is based on actuarial analysis of the life tables developed by govern-
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mental and private interests.203 Life tables are based on death certificates 
and provide an average life expectancy at each age.204 In 2013, a person 
born in the United States could expect to live to be 78.8 years old.205 If you 
live to be sixty, you can expect to live 21.44 more years, and an eighty-year-
old can expect to live an additional 8.13 years while at a hundred, it is 2.09 
additional years.206 The simplest underwriting model looks only at the in-
sured’s age at the inception of a given policy year and the expected years of 
life for the individual’s birth cohort. For an annually renewing policy, the 
premium for a given amount of coverage increases with the insured’s age.207 
At advanced ages, the cost of insurance approaches the value of the policy 
and buying insurance no longer makes economic sense. 
Underwriting can be refined by incorporating additional risk factors. 
For example, the basic life expectancy table includes both smokers and non-
smokers. The insurer can include smoking into the underwriting. This will 
increase the expected years of life for non-smokers and reduce it for smok-
ers, so that smokers will pay more for life insurance at any given age. Addi-
tional information about the individual insured’s health or risk taking profile 
allows a more accurate estimate of the insured’s life expectancy than simply 
using the life tables.208 For example, from birth, a woman has an 81.0-year 
life expectancy and a man has a 76.2-year life expectancy.209 Black men, on 
average, have a 4.7-year lower life expectancy than white men.210 In a pure 
market insurance system, blacks would pay more for life insurance than 
whites and men would pay more than women. From an actuarial perspec-
tive, these are both neutral rating criteria. 
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2. Social Justice and Life Insurance 
As social policy, these racial and sexual criteria are problematic. The 
most sustained controversy over individual ratings for insurance has been 
over race-based ratings for life insurance.211 Stretching back more than a 
hundred years, the insurance industry conflated discriminatory rates and 
rates that reflected different life expectancy risks for blacks.212 This has 
been largely resolved in favor of requiring that life insurance rates for 
blacks be priced the same for whites.213 On average, this creates a subsidy 
(social benefit) for black insureds as long as there is a discrepancy between 
white and black death rates.214 While this distorts the market, it supports a 
social policy against race-based classifications. In contrast, women were 
originally lumped with men and thus paid premiums based on a higher av-
erage life expectancy rather than on a life expectancy based on gender strat-
ified rates.215 Eventually, social policy was changed so that women and men 
are rated separately so that women pay the real cost of their risk of dying.216 
Persons with certain genetic diseases can have considerably shortened 
life expectancies.217 If the person already manifests the disease when he or 
she applies for individual insurance, the insurer is allowed to take this into 
consideration and charge more for the policy or deny coverage.218 But what 
if there is no manifestation of the disease, only a genetic test that shows the 
potentiality for developing the disease?219 Should the insurer be allowed to 
test for possible future illnesses? This would increase the accuracy of the 
rating process, and thus reduce the cost for those who are not potentially 
afflicted. On the other hand, it would burden those with genetic diseases—
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something they have no control over—with increased, potentially unafford-
able costs. Public policy is still developing in this area.220 
3. Is There Moral Hazard in Life Insurance? 
The insurance programs for coastal risk create moral hazard by shift-
ing the risks of living on the coast to other insureds and tax payers, thus 
incentivizing risky behavior. These public policy modifications to the pure 
market model for life insurance are adverse characteristics that cannot be 
modified by the individual; this means that they should not create moral 
hazard while supporting social policy beyond the availability of purely 
market priced insurance.221 It is also assumed that generally individuals will 
not try to die early to collect insurance and that having health insurance 
does encourage people to get sick.222 
C. Structuring Life Insurance for Coastal Properties 
Sea level rise creates a limited life expectancy for low-lying coastal 
property. As with life insurance for people, death is certain but the timing is 
uncertain. Unlike with human life insurance, there are no life tables for 
coastal property. Coastal property life insurance would need to be priced by 
determining the probability of inundation for a given location and property 
at a sequence of future times. Climate models would provide the basic pro-
jections for global sea level rise in the future. As human life insurance rat-
ings are refined with factors such as whether the insured is a smoker, the 
impact of sea level would need to be modified by specific information about 
the location and the property. 
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1. Rating Factors 
The starting point would be to determine local relative sea level rise. 
This is the average global sea level rise plus local factors that affect the ele-
vation of the land and whether local sea level rise deviates from global sea 
level rise. Some coastal areas are still undergoing glacial isostatic adjust-
ment (“GIA”), which is the rebound of the land after being depressed by the 
weight of the ice during the last ice age.223 Long-term tide gauge data from 
sites undergoing GIA shows falling sea levels.224 GIA is a deep (crustal) 
process and is generally six millimeters a year or less.225 In North America, 
the highest rates for GIA are in the Hudson Bay area where the ice was 
thickest and melted most recently.226 
Coastal subsidence is more common than GIA and makes tidal gauges 
register a higher rate of sea level rise than the global average.227 Subsidence 
is a major problem on river deltas, where more than half a billion people 
live.228 River deltas naturally experience subsidence from shallow processes 
such as the compaction of recent sediments, deep processes such as the 
crustal deformation that creates the accommodation space for the delta, and 
localized hot spots of subsidence associated with faulting on the delta.229 
The crustal deformation and shallow compaction can result in up to twelve 
millimeters of subsidence a year, while faulting can result in subsidence 
rates of up to thirty millimeters a year.230 
Ground water pumping causes the most serious widespread subsidence 
on river deltas.231 Jakarta, Indonesia is on a deltaic plane fed by thirteen 
rivers.232 Jakarta is subsiding at up to ten centimeters a year, which may 
result in as much as six meters of subsidence by 2100.233 Most of this is 
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driven by ground water extraction.234 Jakarta is now sitting in a depression 
that traps flood waters. In 2007, more than 200,000 people were displaced 
by flooding, and 1400 were hospitalized for waterborne diarrheal diseases 
and Dengue Fever, spread by mosquitoes that breed in the pooled flood wa-
ters.235 In New Orleans, ground water pumping may have lowered critical 
flood control structures by 0.8 meters before Hurricane Katrina.236 
The second is the correction for local sea level rise.237 For example, 
local hydrologic geologic factors appear to cause Cape Hatteras off the east 
coast of North Carolina to see more than three to four times the global aver-
age sea level rise.238 A related issue is how the local geographic features 
affect storm surge. Research on the Mississippi River Delta shows that the 
submerged, abandoned delta lobes, which create large areas of shallow wa-
ter with a flat bottom, significantly increase storm surge.239 Property on an 
estuary can also see increased surge, depending on the direction that the 
storm takes across the estuary.240 The distance from the shore and the eleva-
tion of the property will also affect the probability of flooding. 
2. Policy Term 
Life insurance can be purchased as a year-to-year renewable contract, 
with the cost of coverage increasing each year, based on the life tables and 
individual rating factors. This allows the insurer to rerate the policy each 
year, based on changes in the insured’s health, or cancel the policy if the 
insurer is worried about the insured dying too early. Unlike property insur-
ance, an insured may also buy a multi-year contract of insurance.241 This 
may be a variable rate contract, with the premium increasing on a known 
schedule each year, or a fixed price contract where the insured pays the 
same premium each year for the term of the policy.242 
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There have been proposals to sell flood insurance as a multi-year 
product, with a fixed premium for the term.243 The insurance would run 
with the property, not the owner, so the policy could be transferred if the 
property was sold. 244  This would help property owners by assuring the 
availability of affordable flood insurance and it would assure that coverage 
would be maintained by tying the long-term contract into the mortgage on 
the property.245 The author recognizes that such insurance would only in-
centivize adaptation if the rates were risk-based, rather than being subsi-
dized, and if there was a discount for taking measures that reduce risk.246 
The problem with this version of long-term property insurance is that it 
is intended to create stability for the property owner to insure that property 
owners maintain their insurance.247 My proposal is to fully embrace the life 
insurance model and require insurers to provide a schedule of premium in-
creases based on the average sea level rise projections, adjusted for the risk 
factors of the insured’s property. This would be a life table for coastal risk 
for the property. The insured would pay an increasing premium if the policy 
was an annual policy. The insured could also buy a term policy for the term 
of the mortgage, which would have a set premium rate for the term of the 
policy. 
3. Shifting Incentives 
Forcing insurers to assume the risk of sea level rise by guaranteeing 
the rate for twenty to thirty years should give them an incentive to be realis-
tic in projecting the future risk of sea level rise. The insured would also be 
told that the policy would be significantly more expensive at renewal, and 
that it might not be renewable at all, depending on the rate of sea level rise. 
Rather than providing steady state earth insurance stability, it would force 
the property owner to internalize the risk of sea level rise. This could be 
offset by selling the property and moving inland, or by elevating or harden-
ing the property, if feasible. 
Research has shown that property values rapidly recover in the year af-
ter major hurricane damage.248 This may be due to reduction in the housing 
market, which drives up prices, the impact of disaster aid, or other factors 
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that have not been characterized.249 Longer-term studies confirm this ef-
fect.250 In New Orleans, the U.S. city hardest hit by a hurricane in modern 
times and a delta city subject to rapidly escalating sea level rise risk, there 
has been a housing bubble post-Katrina.251 Rising property values make it 
much harder to institute land use restrictions and they encourage new de-
velopment in high-risk areas. Risk-based insurance with an escalating pre-
mium that would effectively communicate the climate change risk for the 
property could eliminate this post-disaster property value bump and would 
ideally reduce the value of the property through time. As the property loses 
value because of the increasing cost of the insurance or at the expiration of 
the policy if insurance is no longer available at an affordable price, there 
should be less resistance to the restrictions on development. 
D. Transitioning to a Life Insurance Model 
Changing the NFIP is a daunting challenge. As of the end of 2011, the 
NFIP had 5.6 million policies in force nationwide covering approximately 
$1.3 trillion in property. 252  By June 30, 2012, the NFIP was 
$17,750,000,000 in debt.253 The debt was entirely due to catastrophic losses 
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—in all other years, premium income off-
set payouts.254 This debt and the perverse incentives arising from subsidized 
flood insurance led Congress to pass a major reform of the NFIP, the Big-
gert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.255 This was a major re-
form that eliminated subsidies for second homes and repetitive loss proper-
ties and phased subsidies out for properties that were added to the program 
recently.256 The annual cap on premium increases was raised from ten to 
twenty percent.257 
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This bold reform lasted less than two years before Congress rolled 
back most of the reforms in face of massive opposition from high-risk 
communities and interest groups.258 One of the most powerful arguments 
was that the NFIP provides insurance to the poor and working class, who 
would not be able to afford their homes under the reforms.259 In reality, the 
NFIP primarily benefits wealthy individuals and wealthy communities.260 
While poor counties do get substantial benefits, a fine-grained study shows 
that it is often a small, wealthy part of the county that gets the benefits.261 
For example, in a typical beach community, the property at or close to the 
water’s edge will be very valuable, but the property values fall off quickly 
as you move inland where permanent residents of the community live.262 
More than fifty percent of the policies are in the wealthy states of Texas and 
Florida. 263  The NFIP has a wealthy and powerful constituency that has 
shown its ability to thwart reform. 
Two trends could create a window for meaningful reform and help 
move coastal property insurance toward a life insurance model. First is the 
increasing reluctance of Congress to provide blank check disaster relief as it 
did for Katrina, as evidenced by the opposition to relief after Hurricane 
Sandy.264 Secondly, big businesses and large employers with extensive capi-
tal facilities in coastal areas are effectively outside of the NFIP because its 
commercial coverage is limited to $500,000 for buildings and $500,000 for 
contents.265 These business properties are outside of the NFIP and they must 
buy unsubsidized commercial insurance. Sellers of commercial insurance 
for high risk properties depend on the reinsurance industry to take on some 
of the risk and to spread this risk to capital markets through securitiza-
tion.266 Without this global risk sharing, insurance will not be available.267 
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Swiss Re is the largest international reinsurance company and it is in-
cluding climate change risk in its products.268 The rest of the reinsurance 
industry is also concerned about climate change.269 Incorporating climate 
risk will increase the cost of insurance because it is uncertain and the rein-
surance and capital markets are reluctant to take on uncertain risks.270 In the 
worst case, insurance may become unavailable in high-risk areas, which 
would drive businesses to relocate or be forced to self-insure.271 In the long-
term, businesses will face progressive increases in coverage for coastal 
properties subject to sea level rise risk. They will be priced off the coast. 
While there is no reason for the private insurers to explicitly define a life-
time for coastal property, they will effectively do that by creating a point 
where it will not make financial sense to be on the coast. The only missing 
piece would be to require private insurers to project a future rate schedule 
based on sea level rise for commercial coastal risk insurance. 
Coastal economies will be hollowed out by the loss of non-tourism 
employers to lower cost areas and the remaining tourist-based business will 
face increasing disruptions by low level flooding. Some deep-water ports 
will prosper, but many rivers and estuary ports, such as New Orleans, will 
have increasing difficulties keeping channels open for shipping. 272  The 
states and the federal government will eventually have to confront the fact 
that coastal communities are not economically viable and will need to be 
relocated. Cutting off the NFIP will not be politically possible and would 
cause terrible hardships. The NFIP, however, could be transformed into a 
life insurance model by instituting a set fee increase schedule. The govern-
ment could also offer a buy-out schedule if the property owner wants to 
abandon the property and thus eliminate the government’s insurance risk. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unlikely that legislatures will dismantle the National Flood Insur-
ance Program and citizens’ insurance plans and prohibit disaster aid in the 
near term. What is more likely is that as disaster losses increase, less and 
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less money will be appropriated for coastal protection in any given commu-
nity and disaster relief will be less generous. Through time, as the core 
businesses are priced off the coast and the infrastructure degrades due to 
increased tidal and storm flooding, local economies will fail. In coastal 
communities that are not destroyed by hurricanes, the end game is a failed 
city or town, bankrupt and hollowed out as it falls into the sea. It would be 
much better policy to accept that these communities have a limited lifetime. 
This would allow a real discussion about retreat over a timeframe of dec-
ades that might allow better preservation of the local culture and relation-
ships. This discussion will not happen, however, until we admit that climate 
change matters and has consequences. Accepting that coastal properties 
have a limited lifetime is the first step. 
  
 
 
